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Expressions of Naga ‘Identity’ in Nagaland and Beyond

 

 

 

“I believe in the true meeting of East and West. Love is the ultimate truth of soul. We should do all we can not to outrage that truth, but to carry its banner against all opposition. The idea of non-co-operation unnecessarily hurts that truth. It is not our hearth-fire, but the fire that burns out our hearth and home …” From Rabindranath Tagore, Letters to a Friend, edited by C.F. Andrews (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1928), pp. 128-37. (Guha 2012, 202).

 

 

 

 

 

Introduction

 

“The ‘locality’ of national culture is neither unified nor unitary in relation to itself, nor must it be seen simply as ‘other’ in relation to what is outside or beyond it. The boundary is Janus-faced and the problem of outside/inside must always itself be a process of hybridity, incorporating new ‘people’ in relation to the body politic, generating other sites of meaning and, inevitably, in the political process, producing unmanned sites of political antagonism and unpredictable forces for political representation. The address to nation as narration stresses the insistence of political power and cultural authority in what Derrida describes as the ‘irreducible excess of the syntactic over the semantic’. What emerges as an effect of such ‘incomplete signification’ is a turning of boundaries and limits into the in-between spaces through which the meanings of cultural and political authority are negotiated (Bhaba 1990, 4)”.

 

 

 

Harvard Professor of English and American Literature Bhaba argues in the above quote, from the introduction to the book Nation and Narration (1990), that political meanings and narratives of the nation in regard to in - and/or exclusion are under constant negotiation at the site(s) of boundaries. This is an interesting starting point for a perspective with which to look at the political position of social groups in the North-Eastern frontiers of the Indian republic, like for example Naga – identity in the North-Eastern state of Nagaland near the border with Myanmar. Ethnographer Wettsein states that over the past years an ‘ethnic identity’ has become ‘real’ among the different naga – tribes (Wettstein 2016, 387). Yet at the same time Wettstein argues that these identities are not as clear cut or fixed, but are constantly (re) – negotiated in a certain performative manner (Wettstein 2016, 391). As will be shown the nation also has a place in this performance and in this way it might to a certain extent relate to the theoretical arguments made by Bhaba. Particularly because in the above quote it claims that at the boundaries of a (national) narrative a hybrid process works and thus the other is always “…between ourselves (Bhaba 1990, 4)”.

 

However I wonder whether the concepts of hybridity and negotiation are sufficient for explaining a political process, without taking into account other factors and the state’s dominant ideology and/or narrative & political needs (Raychaudhuri 2012, 177). While Bhaba might be right in regards to symbolic meaning(s) and the ability of minority groups in changing (national) narratives (Bhaba 1990, 3), it is not enough in my opinion to only study the symbolic aspects of narratives shared and changed by both majorities and minorities in order to understand political dynamics and/or political success. So when shifting our attention again to the region of North-Eastern India, the question that this paper aims to investigate and answer is as follows: How do different identities and/or political narratives relate to performative practices in the political context of the Naga conflict in Nagaland in the North-East of the Indian republic?

 

The focus of the above question means that this paper is to a certain extent a theoretical exploration, in which the nation is as a political narrative among many though dominant. By looking at the relation between political narratives and the question of identity, it becomes possible to investigate the ambiguity on which the nation state narrative (or also the minority interest) rests in events/times/places of political antagonism (Raychaudhuri 2012, 179). The following section will begin with a theoretical exploration of the relation between identity, narrative, politics and the postcolonial state in order to put the discussion in a longer historical frame. Afterwards the paper will briefly sketch the context and historical background of the struggle by Naga groups in the North-East of India for independence and their relation to the national and regional governments in the region. Then the attention will shift to two different studies of performative practices among Naga groups in Nagaland. The first describes the emergence of an apparent Pan (ethnic) Naga identity through certain dance events, while the other describes the use of an apparent typical North-Eastern Food among Naga-groups in Nagaland and at other places. Although these studies might at first sight seem to cover quite different topics, their comparison and connection to the earlier theoretical chapter will enable some insights in the relationship between identities, narratives and performativity. At the conclusion an argument will be made about how to connect the three concepts with each other, both within the context of the Nagaland studies and a wider theoretical debate.

 

Identity within the (Indian) postcolonial nation state

 

When talking about different minority narratives in relation to the dominant narrative of the state, it is inevitable to also talk about the concept identity. In his book Identity and Violence Nobel laureate Sen conceptualizes social identity as “… sharing an identity with others of a particular group .... (Sen 2006, xii)”. Sen acknowledges on the same page that identity in any form is an imagination, as there are so many associations and affiliations possible in our daily lives and in particular contexts. Any categorization can lead to violence, as this leads to a competition or challenge by “… competing identities (Sen 2006, 4)”. Therefore Sen argues that “… there’s a critically important need to see the role of choice in determining the cogency and relevance of particular identities which are inescapably diverse (Sen 2006, 4)”. In the book Sen gives a strong theoretical critique of any social theory that makes neat distinction between certain identities, which can be seen as a laudable goal in itself. Additionally the idea of choice (or agency?) can be a relevant addition to Bhaba, who only marks sites of political antagonism and negotiation without giving an explanation as to how such a process might work. Or how a hierarchy or dominance of identity comes into being through negotiation.

 

At the same time when talking about the cogency of an identity, which in this article can be seen as a possible dominant narrative (of the state) and (perhaps) less powerful minority narratives, Sen does not go further in explaining as to how an identity’s cogency is constructed or maintained. Its cogency should be seen as the strength of its narrative, which Bhaba conceptualizes as a narrative that is formed in a boundary zone through negotiation. Both theoretical perspectives have flaws. Bhaba seems to envision the creation of one political narrative, in this regard the state, while Sen envisions multiple identities that are in conflict with each other. This paper acknowledges the dominance of a nation – state political narrative, but also attempts to embed within this perspective the reality of competing identities within the geographical boundary of a country that is ruled by a nation-state. A nation state is in this paper thus seen as a political entity, which envisions to represent all its subjects. In order to contextualize this conflict between the former and those apparently outside it historically, the discussion now briefly moves to a debate about the meaning of the postcolonial: especially because the nation state of India can be seen as postcolonial.

 

This term has been subject to intense scrutiny in regards to its meaning theoretically speaking, but a general description is given by Dirlik: “…As a description of this world situation … [the postcolonial] … represents not the abolition but the reconfiguration of earlier forms of domination … [due to] … diversion of attention from contemporary problems (Dirlik 1994, 331)”, meaning that the postcolonial era after colonization is still greatly influenced by remnants of its past. In this way the postcolonial is a period that apparently describes a state of affairs within regions that have been dominated in different ways. Yet Hall criticizes Dirlik’s reductionism of the relation between the postcolonial and global capitalism, which Hall sees as influenced by the universalizing idea of the decolonization process of the post – colonial (Hall 1996, 246). Hall instead argues that we should go beyond such rather functionalist explanations (Hall 1996, 259) that see the (postcolonial) world as being subject to continuous domination and to a certain sense as a victim of that. The postcolonial is according to Hall a political negotiation between continuing decolonization and the crisis of post-independence (Hall 1996, 244), in which perhaps some kind of (political?) choice was made about which way to go in regards to the connection between identity, narrative and the nation state.

 

Within the Indian postcolonial nation state there are several examples to be given in which the narrative of the nation state shows no regard for other/local perspectives, leading to resistance by an apparent homogeneous identity group that attempts to make political headways through showing their own (alternative) narrative. An example of this is given by Routledge, who describes the conflict around the construction of dams in the Narmada river valley in India (Routledge 2003, 243). The Indian state wanted to use the dams to provide electricity to its citizens and this is also the state’s narrative for legitimizing its actions (Routledge 2003, 259). The state made a choice or decision to disregard the livelihoods of the locals, in favor of the wider ‘national’ ‘community’. A local grassroots/international organization resisted against this by using different discursive arguments and positions to delegitimize the actions of the Indian state with varying success (Routledge 2003, 260).

 

Its success varied because not all within the valley followed its political narratives and decided to maintain its relationships with the government (Routledge 2003, 263). Yet one interesting aspect of the political discourses aired by the NBA1, according to the author the principal protagonist politically against the state’s narrative (Routledge 2003, 243), is the use of testimonials and slogans. In regards to testimonials this ‘form’ of narrative can be seen as a performative element of their politics that might bind together internal differences and “… are normative, constructing a political climate in which resistance occurs (Routledge 2003, 262)”. In this paper performativity is regarded in its widest meaning as any expression of a political narrative through a public action, which is my own definition. According to Routledge such performances are also themselves platforms to create action or enable resistance, as they are normative through the narrative or discourses that is aired through them. In this localized perspective from the Narmada valley, identity is made through a political narrative against the state narrative. The remaining sections of this paper will investigate whether such a theoretical conceptualization makes sense within the context of the Naga struggle, especially also when keeping mind the state’s political narrative.

 

Context and historical background of the Naga’s

 

But first some background and context is required to better place the arguments of this paper: The Northeastern region of India geographically comprises Sikkim and parts of West – Bengal, but this paper makes a separate distinction for the region comprising the following states: Manipur, Nagaland, Assam, Meghalaya, Tripura, Mizoram and Arunachal Pradesh. Due to restrictions of the Indian national state and regional geopolitics, the states have been underrepresented across different academic disciplines (Khan Suan Hausing 2015, 277). The region of Northeast India is at the same time also seen as being part of the Northwestern periphery of Southeast Asia (Barkataki-Ruscheweyh & Lauser 2013, 189), which adds to the image of a cultural and ethnic complex region identity wise. Nagaland is located at the border with the independent nation of Myanmar, but also lies next to the Indian states of Manipur and Assam. Nagaland comprises a majority of Naga – tribes, while also Manipur is comprised of several Naga – tribes (Ngaihte 2014, 26). In a study by social psychologists Zagefka and Jamir at least 17 different tribes were recognized among their sample of respondents in their investigation (Zagefka & Jamir 2015, 46). Then there are also several other groups within North-East India that are supposedly related to the Naga, like the small ethnic groups commonly referred to as Tsanga in Assam and Arunachal Pradesh (Barkataki-Ruscheweyh 2013, 242).

 

The state of Nagaland was formed in March 1961 (Gokhale 1961, 36). Already before that there was the issue of Naga identity, dating back to the treaty of Yandaboo signed in 1826 between the British and the Burmese (Hussain 2008, 547). Multiple insurgencies against Indian armed forces lasted from 1954 till 1997 (Ngaihte 2014, 25), making it in this way one of the longest running wars worldwide without much international recognition. After several attempts a ceasefire was signed between one of the insurgence groups called NSCN(IM), the National Socialist Council of Nagalim, and the Indian government (Hussain 2008, 547). This peace process has now already lasted 19 years, but apparently a possible solution is now in sight.

 

However inter – tribal conflict has been a difficult subject, as several rebel groups have broken off from the most powerful insurgence group NSCN(IM) since their ceasefire with the Indian government in 1997 (Hussain 2008, 547). These intertribal Naga, and even interethnic (other groups than Naga’s), conflicts also have a long history (Ngaihte 2014, 28; Wettstein 2016, 385), with such conflict occurring as recent as 2008 (Hussain 2008, 556). It is now generally observed that in Nagaland the conflict is coming to an end, leading to “… the state government itself and the civil society … taking centre-stage in an ongoing quest for peace and reconciliation (Piang, 2015. In: Ngaithe 2015, 377).

 

A Pan – (ethnic) Naga identity?

 

An interesting case of the increasing role by the state government (of Nagaland, so part of the Indian government) in this quest for peace is presented by Wettstein. She describes a contemporary development of Naga – identity in relation to a political narrative intertwined with a Pan – Naga identity (Wettstein 2016, 387). Wettstein describes several “… collective performative event[s] … [ in which] … concepts such as ‘ethnic identity’ can become effectively inscribed into a person’s self-image and value system (Wettstein 2016, 395)”. Examples of such events are the Hornbill festival held outside the state’s capital of Kohima, where dance performances are given of shared stories, or other pan Naga expressions like the Nagaland fashion week, which apparently is the most prominent sector in which such performative practices/events can be found (Wettstein 2016, 389). Additionally there was also a Naga parade vehicle during the 2004 Republic Day Parade, during which participants wore costumes often worn during the previously mentioned Hornbill festival (Wettstein 2016, 388). Wettstein observes that this performative festival is built upon layers of identity that moves from the individual to the tribal and then to the pan Naga level that got added over time, and is also found also in other instances of Naga study (Wettstein 2016, 390).

 

Wettstein acknowledges that these performative practices/events can be used by interests groups for their own ends (Wettstein 2016, 395), as the Hornbill festival has been an initiative of the state of Nagaland where tribal groups use the platform to express their own identity (Wettstein 2016, 387). This is on first sight an interesting and somewhat unique expression of identity, which shows also that minority groups change a dominant narrative of identity for their own ends. They thus have changed the meaning of the performative event, seen by Wettstein as showcasing that there are several different forms of identity that coincide of which ethnic identity is just one (Wettstein 2016, 395). A similar process occurs in the fashion sector that clings to ideas of cosmopolitanism, while only scarcely embedding ethnic or traditional ideas within their fashion (Wettstein 2016, 390). Yet what these two expressions of an apparent Pan ‘ethnic’ Naga identity actually show, is that different interest groups actively choose a narrative expression of their identity for their own political ends by contrasting themselves with other ‘competing’ identities (Sen 2006, 4) during such events organized by the nation state.

 

Seen in a larger perspective this might be a conscious choice of the nation state. Ngaithe makes an interesting remark in regards to the change of Naga groups from claiming independence to demanding a form of integration within the Indian state with certain exceptions for Nagaland: the 9/11 attacks, which has led to less international support for insurgence groups worldwide (Ngaithe 2014, 26). As such the strategy and demands of Naga insurgence groups, like the NSCN(IM), had to change. At the same time there’s the issue that there are more insurgence groups besides the NSCN(IM), although it is the strongest player. Hussain rightly remarks that the Indian government cannot afford itself in making separate agreements with other factions (Hussain 2008, 560). Acknowledging the position of different insurgence groups would delegitimize the Indian state and the ‘community’ it represents (Raychaudhuri 2012, 183). Thus in this study it is not so much a process of hybridity or negotiation between the postcolonial nation state’ narrative about excluding (aspects of) Naga identity from their ‘rightful’ place within the Indian state, but rather a balancing of choices between (material/political) possibilities and related identities by interest groups. So they are not completely dominated by the state during the performative events, as identities and narratives become intertwined in their performative expressions. In this case tribal identities are competing with other tribal identities, or cosmopolitan ideals with the nation state.

 

Naga Food

 

Another domain in which narrative/performance/identity intertwine, is the study of fermented soya beans known as Akhuni in Nagaland (Kikon 2015, 320). This type of food is also consumed by other social groups in the North-East of India, as well as by people from the North-East living in other states and cities of the Indian nation like New Delhi. It has caught the attention of academic scholars when in 2007 this type of food led to a conflict in New Delhi and a notion from the local police to stop cooking this food, as other residents apparently found the smell and taste of the food quite unpleasant (Kikon 2015, 320). However the attention of this paper is not on this particular conflict between people and/or groups from different cultural backgrounds and origins in India, but rather on the performative character of Akhuni within Nagaland itself and among Naga tribal groups. In this light the food and its associated practices might have a similar character as the dance events described by Wettstein as part of a layered (Pan) Naga identity (Wettstein 2016, 390).

 

The focus of Kikon’s article is both on the use of Akhuni within Indian metropolitan cuisine, as well its local meaning among tribal groups in Nagaland. In regards to the former the author makes an interesting point: “The centrality of Akhuni to this latter set of relationships [between ethnic groups from the North-East and other regions] is also moderated by the state, best captured in advice from the Delhi police urging a curb on Akuni-eating habits in Delhi in 2007 (Kikon 2015, 321)”. This example shows again the usefulness of looking at the role of the nation at sites or boundaries of contestation (Bhaba 1990, 4), especially also because Kikon moves on by explaining on the same page that Naga groups actively resist such measures due to the importance of this food for their identity (Kikon 2015, 322). Additionally this in – between space is also negotiated, because of the framing of North-East food in a (modern) narrative of being organic and healthy (Kikon 2015, 323).

 

Still this only one part of the story, as Akhuni has quite a different meaning for different Naga’s and in Nagaland itself. Comparable with the case of the Pan – Naga identity described by Wettstein Akhuni food practices like cooking during certain public events are characterized by strong separate tribal distinctions (Kikon 2015, 328). Within this performative practice of food and taste, ethnic or tribal identity is only one among many (Sen 2006, xii). Most importantly Kikon states that “…vocal kinema/akhuni eaters are more closely aligned to political societies that are formed through everyday sites of negotiation and contestation (Kikon 2015, 331)”. At the same (and page) Kikon also acknowledges the historical connections that are (one of the) influences on these everyday politics, which as mentioned in the case of Wettstein are also part of the intertribal struggle that has characterized Nagaland for a long time

 

Unfortunately it does not become clear in the article of Kikon how and why certain choices are made in the use of these food practices within the contestation between tribal groups, although this choice is more strongly shown at the site of contestation within New Delhi where Akhuni cookers for example look for the right time to cook food (Kikon 2015, 334). Yet this might have quite a logical explanation as in the former context there is a wider (layered) identity of Naga’s who share similar food, while in the other context a state eventually decides/choses to limit the use of Akhuni. On one side this can be theorized as a boundary zone of contestation and negotiation, but on the other side it can also be understood as a process in which an eventual contingency occurs that leads to a state narrative within the context of Delhi as a cosmopolitan locality. The same is probably the case in the historical struggle between the different Naga tribes, of which the performative is both just an expression and a political tool to continue highlighting each other’s differences as the result of historical processes and/or contingencies.

 

Conclusion & Discussion

 

Finding a Balance for the Semantic and the Syntactic.

Performativity in politics is connected to concepts about identity, narrative, the nation, legitimacy and different understandings of where and how conflict takes place: its locations. It could even be said that all these concepts are interrelated to a certain degree, making it rather difficult to understand political processes in their entirety. However the idea of a layered Naga – identity gives an interesting new theoretical vantage point (Wettstein 2016, 390), showing how expressions like dance events and the preparation of food are strong performances of certain (ethnic or other) identities of culturally distinctive groups (Eriksen 2010, 5). Additionally the political narratives of these performances are different in other contexts or ‘boundary zones’, as a choice has to be made as to what is possible within each context. Seeing this as ‘simply’ a negotiation of cultural and political authority in different localities (Bhaba 1990, 4) hides the reality of the Naga – conflict, because of the intertribal conflict and the limits as to what each group is capable of achieving within the boundaries of their own political narrative and that of others.

 

Of course also the postcolonial nature of the Indian nation state is of influence on the the Naga conflict and its performative practices. Within the case of the North-East and Nagaland, postcolonial India (as a state) could not just grant autonomy to Nagaland. Perhaps also because of all the other struggles that were/are going on in the rest of India, of which contemporary examples are of course Kashmir, the Naxalites and several other examples. The Indian state has never been eager to involve third party mediation within negotiations with the Naga - groups or for example in Kashmir (Hussain 2008, 554), as this would lend legitimacy to terms like indigenous peoples in a for example more international political context (Karlsson 2001, 34) of which the Naga (and other minorities) could benefit politically through using this in their narrative. Explaining the postcolonial in India needs to account for this historical background and requires seeing the Naga struggles as post-colonial “… political event[s] …. in which both the crisis of the uncompleted struggle for ‘decolonisation’ and the crisis of the ‘post-independence’ state are deeply inscribed … (Hall 1996, 244).

 

While this kind of a description helps to better understand the conflict between different political narratives, it also creates the impression that such conflicts are continuous and never-ending. Continuous in the sense that there will always be an aspect in the struggle that can be pointed towards as a result of pre-independence dominance. Certain performative practices and narratives are clearly a choice, influenced by a historical process of contingency in which identities have come into conflict each other in different localities. The Naga’ layers of identity then add to this complexity, as on some levels the Naga tribes are competing with each other and other levels with the nation state. Thus solving and describing the conflict should also move away from only focusing on the nation state’s narrative.

 

Finally I want to finish with a comment on the research regarding political narratives. Of course the role of the nation state can in some instances be seen as all powerful, it has come to define and control the way in which resources are divided and negotiated in this postcolonial era. The article of Routledge about the Narmada valley also shows this, which focuses on the discursive resistance of those who do not agree with the state’s narrative despite it varying success (Routledge 2003, 243). Yet should academic researchers continue to pursue this activism that attempts to show the bad sides of the nation state’s narrative and its consequential actions and unforeseen effects? Though sometimes there certainly is an excess of the syntactic over the semantic (Bhaba 1990, 4), should scholars not also confront the reality in which the semantic can change the syntactic and vice versa in a beneficial manner for (sometimes) possibly both? This is possible as a certain element of choice is always involved, as the Naga performativity studies and the study of Routledge show. On the other side some scholars might argue that such reasoning gives too much nuance to the reality of people’s poor conditions. However we should not let ideology overtake us. Nobel laureate Rabindranath Tagore always attempted to see and/or use the best of both worlds (East & West), we should do the same. Yet without burning our home, when we do have ‘impact’.

 

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The Indian Express reported on August 25, 2016, that the Modi – government and the National Socialist Council of Nagalim (NSCN(IM)) were close to a final solution after their final talks on August 19 of the same year. Source: http://indianexpress.com/article/india/india-news-india/nagaland-india-peace-talk-conflict-nscn-gprn-2994606/ (accessed December 12th 2016).